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The role of international institutions in MNC – host country relations 
1. Introduction 
Recently a wider range of political strategies used by MNEs to influence host govern-
ment decision-making raised a sufficient interest from international business and political 
economy scholars   (Akbar & Kisilowski, 2015; Doh, Lawton, & Rajwani, 2012; Hillman & 
Wan, 2005; Li et al, 2013). It is argues that such strategies have particular importance for 
MNEs from emerging economies as state in these countries traditionally plays an significant 
role in business affairs. MNEs invest in their political capabilities to bargain with the authori-
ties not only to approach their interest in host countries (Holburn & Zelner, 2010), but also to 
reap home government support for their outward investments (Li et al, 2013b; Wang, Hong, 
Kafouros & Wright, 2012a). 
Strategic interdependence between MNCs and governments (Dunning, 1988; Stopford, 
1994) has been subject of research interest for a long time. It contains both bargaining and 
collaborating mechanisms, with both competitive and collaborative aims vis-a-vis each other 
in resource sharing process (Luo, 2004). MNCs and governments depend on each other’s re-
sources and supports but meanwhile they encounter conflicts arising from different goals and 
an absence of mechanisms mitigating possible opportunism. Economic and social goals pur-
sued by governments and MNCs do not always coincide (Daniels et al, 2004). Some authors 
state that FDI rules and policies are likely to move in a direction desired by the party who 
holds a dominant bargaining position (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994). 
The “accepted paradigm of host country – multinational corporation (MNC) relations in 
international political economy” (Kobrin, 1987: 610) was called the bargaining power model. 
In classical bargaining model the deal between MNC and host government reflects the need 
for and scarcity of the resources proposed by two parties as well as their bargaining skills 
(Fagre and JR, 1982). 
Three important aspects should be considered speaking about the bargaining power 
model.  First, the existence of different bases of power, which usually vary among actors. 
Second, causal relationship between each actor’s resources and constraints and bargaining 
outcomes. And third is dynamic nature of bargaining. The third aspect is presented by obso-
lescing bargaining (OB) model (Vernon, 1971). 
Eden and Molot (2002) argue that the OB model has outlived its usefulness, however it 
might be revitalized and still used for understanding bargaining process and outcomes. More-
over scholars call for more studies examining the role of international institutions in the bar-
gaining power model (Ramamurti, 2001; Boddewyn, 2016). By this study we aim to revisit 
the OB model applying it to the context of two emerging markets bargaining and reveal its 
dynamic nature and the role of home government and supranational institutions. Thus we 
pose following research questions: How does bargaining between emerging market MNC 
and emerging host country change over time? What are driving forces of this change? 
In order to answer these research question we explore the bargaining process between 
Russian MNC (Rusal) and Montenegro host country who owns the aluminium smelter com-
pany.  Kombinat Aluminijuma Podgorica - KAP (English: Aluminium Plant Podgorica) is an 
aluminium smelter company, located on the southern outskirts of Podgorica, Montenegro. It 
was built during the communist FR Yugoslavia, and sold in 2005 to world’s second largest 
aluminum company – Moscow based firm Rusal. The investment has run into many problems 
since, and the ownership of stakes in company is currently disputed between Rusal, Montene-
grin government, and new owners of the company that had acquired it in 2014.  
Critical discursive approach (Fairclough, 2003; Phillips and Hardy, 2002) allows re-
searchers to focus on issues which easily pass unnoticed in more conventional analysis (Ba-
logun, Jarzabkowski and Vaara, 2011). Especially this method enables better understanding 
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of the complex ways in which discourse is used to form government MNE relationships, how 
specific rhetorical arguments are used (Balogun, Jarzabkowski and Vaara, 2011) 
We aim to analyze media discourses around Montenegro and Russian MNC in both 
countries in order to reveal the dynamic of MNC-host country relationship and to contribute 
to the theoretical development of the bargaining power model. 
Our study suggests that speaking about emerging economies relationship on the level 
MNC – host country one should consider the role of home country and its bargaining power 
first of all. Moreover with a time and evolution of bargaining such important player as supra-
national institution (in this case it is EU) steps in and modifies the power balance. We also 
suggest to add existing bargaining model with two constitutes: relative stake and relative fu-
ture benefits, and to consider bargaining power of both sides accounting these dimensions.  
We proceed with the study by following way: first, we introduce the bargaining power 
theory paying particular attention to obsolescing bargain model and its extensions in the liter-
ature. Than we continue with methodology section describing in detail the discourse analysis 
method and how we apply it for our study. Finally we introduce our findings and discuss 
them, presenting the modified OB model. At the end we outline the limitations and suggest 
future research directions. 
2. Theoretical approaches to MNC-host government relations 
Political economy perspective 
Political economy perspective suggests that MNCs and governments both rival each 
other and cooperate with each other in the organization of economic activity (Boddewyn, 
1988). In other words, firms constantly function as both economic and political actors while 
government is not exogenous to the economy. 
Political economists have long argued that the interaction between businesses and gov-
ernments is a complex, dynamic, and interdependent process in which governments create the 
rules by which businesses must abide, while businesses make efforts to shape governmental 
policies (Boddewyn, 1988; Kofele-Kale, 1992; Moran, 1985). 
As emerging economies are more intensively engaged in global competition, enterprises 
in these economies become increasingly important to governments when these enterprises 
have a heightened role in accommodating their governments’ social and economic concerns, 
such as steering economic growth, advancing technological infrastructure, and enhancing na-
tional competitiveness (Luo, 2001; Ramamurti, 2001; Zhang, 2003). Moreover EMNCs are 
deemed to benefit from these institutional supports through reduced political risk and transac-
tion costs along with improved financial leverages. 
The political economy theory further suggests that, as businesses and governments be-
come more interdependent, governments will be able to play a more significant role in shap-
ing business activities and behaviors (Boddewyn, 1988; Moran, 1985). In order to foster 
closeness between national economies and world economies through the flow of resources, 
goods, services, people, technologies, information, and capital, emerging economy govern-
ments promote OFDI through which EMEs integrate their resources, products and knowledge 
on a global, rather than domestic, basis. When the home country’s degree of openness and 
internationalization is higher, EMEs can benefit more from efficient flows of production fac-
tors within their globally coordinated networks. Thus, they can better arrange global value 
chains through vertical or horizontal integration. 
Sun, Mellahi and Thun (2010) suggest an important reason for caution: the value of po-
litical networks changes over time, and the embedded relationships with political institutions 
that were valuable at one stage of competition can become a handicap at a later stage. This is 
particularly crucial in emerging economies because change is their defining feature. The study 
examines the dynamic value of political embeddedness for the major MNEs that entered the 
market from the early 1980s to the mid-2000s. Drawing upon the experiences of the automo-
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bile MNEs during liberalization, we further explore the non-linear relation between MNE po-
litical embeddedness in host-country markets and their long-run competitive positions in 
emerging economies. 
Recently, however, another stream of literature has reminded us of the potential dark 
side of political embeddedness in emerging economies (Fisman, 2001; Henisz & Delios, 
2004; Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Siegel, 2007). It shows that whereas politically con-
nected firms initially outperform their peers, the value of connections with political actors 
may depreciate rapidly or even become negative after unexpected political shocks. 
A number of scholars (Burt, 1997; Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000; Uzzi, 1997) have cau-
tioned that, in the long term, deeply embedded firms may get trapped in their own web of ties, 
which may limit their choices and constrain their ability to take actions. This poses what Uzzi 
(1997) called ‘‘a paradox of embeddedness’’, where tight coupling in networks may lock 
firms into networks not well suited to new business landscapes, and restrict firms’ ability to 
adapt to the changing business environment. 
Institutional-based view   
The institutional dimension of political embeddedness concerns the accommodation of 
political and social needs from the state (Luo, 2001), so that firms receive critical resources in 
exchange for their support of the political institutions’ strategic objectives. In the case of 
MNEs, political institution embeddedness may be reflected by the willingness and ability of 
an MNE to respond to the strategic and social needs of host-country political institutions (Luo 
et al, 2010). 
Klein at al (1978) argue that the side who wins in negotiation should have more outside 
options. If the outside options of one side are very limited and restricted by the other side 
there will be greater power asymmetry (Abuja and Yayavarem, 2011).  
previous research says that in more democratic regimes the MNC’s property rights are 
more secure because pluralistic government can’t change the rules very fast (Blanton and 
Blanton, 2007; Feng, 2001). However there is contrary opinion stating that MNC’s property 
rights can be more protected and safer under repressive regimes because a ruler can change 
the legislation in favour of MNC without bargaining with opposition (Durham, 1999; London 
and Ross, 1995).  
Henisz and Zelner (2004) argue that when the government is a source of costs MNC 
tends to minimize these cost by mean of lobbying and other mechanisms influencing the poli-
cy. Thus political embeddedness can serve as a critical bridge between institutional outsiders, 
such as MNEs, and insiders within political institutions. 
The institutional environment is defined by Davis and North (1971) as a “set of funda-
mental political, social and legal ground rules that establishes the basis for production, ex-
change and distribution” (p. 6). Institutional arrangements are defined as the ones created be-
tween economic units that govern the ways under which these units cooperate or compete” 
(Davis and North, 1971: 7). 
In an environment where formal institutions are weak informal institutions such as those 
embodied in the interpersonal ties produced by managers may play a crucial role in facilitat-
ing economic exchanges (Peng & Heath, 1996). 
Sun, Mellahi and Thun (2010) argue that “the value of political networks changes over 
time, and the embedded relationships with political institutions that were valuable at one stage 
of competition can become a handicap at a later stage”. Change in emerging economies is 
their defining feature. 
Some scholars (Bucheli and Kim, 2015) emphasize that political integration depends 
not only on host country characteristics but also home country characteristics and the political 
and economic relationship between host and home country. The MNC will be more likely de-
fine its property rights if home country has significant political, economic and military power 
in the world scene (Tarzi, 1991).  
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Moreover Leftwich (2006) underlines the role of international institutions claiming that 
institutions are never neutral, but are designed to distribute benefits to some while disad-
vantaging others.   
2.1. The obsolescing bargain (OB) model function 
The obsolescing bargain (OB) model explains the changing nature of bargaining rela-
tions between an MNE and host country as a function of goals, resources and constraints 
(Eden & Molot, 2002). The first assumption is that both parties voluntary bargain and achieve 
absolute gains. However, the outcomes should favor the party with the stronger resources, 
higher issue salience, weaker constraints and greater coercive power (Vernon, 1971, 1977; 
Kobrin, 1987; Brewer, 1992; Grosse and Bechman, 1992; Grosse, 1996; Vachani, 1995). 
The obsolescing bargain presumes that the initial bargaining for investment favors the 
MNC, but the leverage shifts to the host government over time as the investment in fixed in-
frastructure can be held hostage. As a result host government intent to arbitrarily alter the 
original bargains by imposing higher taxes and nationalizing industrial and natural resource 
subsidiaries. 
In Vivoda (2011) model there is transformation from potential to relevant power. The 
author claims that there is an abundance of obstacles to the full utilization and the relationship 
between potential relative bargaining power and actual relative bargaining power is moderat-
ed by the international and host country contexts. The literature on linkage/nesting recognizes 
that each bargain is embedded in a context constituted of other bargains. Vivoda (2011) iden-
tified following factors affecting relative bargaining power of a host country: firm-specific, 
industry-specific and institutional factors in the international context and same factors plus 
host-state specific (non-industry) factors in the host-country context.  
 
Figure 1. The bargaining model (Fagre & Wells, 1982) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MNC’s sources of bargaining power 
• Technology 
• Product differentiation  
• Ability to bring in capital 
• Exports 
• Product diversity 
• Worldwide size/scale 
• Potential to play countries against 
 th  
Host country’s sources of bargaining 
power 
• Granting access to home-market 
• Granting access to natural resources 
• Granting access to local labor or oth-
er resources 
• Incentives  
• Potential to play MNC’s against one 
another  
Outcome the deal 
• Ownership share of MNC in subsid-
iary; 
• Tariffs / quotas on inputs/outputs 
• Performance requirements  
• Financial restrictions 
• Dispute settlement provisions  
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Relative goals 
In negotiation process than more similar the goals, the less difficult the bargaining pro-
cess and the less the need for the host government to coerce the MNC into activities which are 
beneficial only for host country.  
The MNC goals might be conceptualized on two levels – economic and institutional. 
Firstly, MNC aims to maximize its long-run after-tax global returns (Boddeawyn and Brewer, 
1994) using its market power, legitimacy and efficiency. These motives market and  efficien-
cy-seeking are well studied in international business literature (Dunning, 1993, Eden and 
Molot, 2002). The MNE’s legitimacy in host country is studied in frame of liability of for-
eignness research (Hymer, 1960, Kostova and Zaheer, 1999).  
The host government has its own economic, social and political goals. There are two 
views on MNC-Host country’s goals relations as conflictual (Vernon, 1971; Moran, 1985) 
and as partnership (Dunning, 1993; Luo, 2001).  
Unique Resources 
Vivoda (2011) claims that in order to posses significant bargaining power MNC should 
have an idiosyncratic firm resources and capabilities that are “valuable, rare, imperfectly imi-
table and lack strategically equivalent substitutes”(Barney, 1991). The bargaining power of 
both host government and MNC depends on their ability to withhold resources and capabili-
ties such as capital, technologies, raw materials, managerial skills etc that the other party de-
sires. Than less imitable or less available firm-specific assets than stronger an MNC’s bar-
gaining power.  
Firm level  
MNC that possess more sophisticated configuration of technical, operational and mana-
gerial systems have greater potential bargaining power than host country (Vivoda, 2011; 
Poynter, 1982). Literature also says that financial resources and capital of MNC increase its 
bargaining power vis-à-vis a host government (Bennett and Sharpe, 1985; Fagre and Wells, 
1982; Lecraw, 1984).  
The overall size of MNC is another significant factor influencing its potential bargain-
ing power. Larger MNCs are more likely to have the financial, managerial, and technological 
resources to invest in majority-owned subsidiaries and also to undertake difficult negotiations 
with host government.  
Firm’s reputation and legitimacy in the host country can be an important source of an 
MNC’s bargaining power (Moon and Lado, 2000). Such intangible assets as corporate reputa-
tion, image and brand name have been recognized as important resources by strategy scholars 
(Fombrun and Shanley, 1990).  
Before entry to the host country MNC is an outsider and it has to gain legitimacy in the 
new market. Legitimacy might be achieved when MNC becomes isomorphic with the institu-
tional environment of the host country (Eden et al, 2005). This process requires some time 
and commitment and can be enhanced by the development of partnership with local firms and 
institutions (Vivoda, 2011). If the MNC demonstrates good social performance it facilitate the 
gain of perception the MNC as domestic (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994).  
A host-country level 
A host country’s bargaining power is constrained by the international environment and 
international interdependence constraints a host country’s autonomy (Kobrin, 1987; Tarzi, 
1991). Eden (1992) argues that web of international agreements creates an investment regime 
that offers more protection and bargaining power to MNCs. Moreover the membership in in-
ternational institutions can limit the bargaining power of host government (Doh and Rama-
murti, 2003; Eden and Molot, 2002; Henisz and Zelner, 2005).  
Thus Ramamurti (2001) claims that government-to-government bargains establishes 
framing rules of the game which might constrain MNC-host country bargaining in specific 
areas. Vivoda (2011) argues that it is unlikely that the host government will engage in direct 
or indirect expropriation of MNC’s assets if they are aware that consequence will be an inter-
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national arbitration (Joffe et al, 2009). Nevertheless international institutional environment 
can be a resource for host government as well. For example membership in OPEC can en-
hance host country’s bargaining potential power relative to MNC.  
Host country’s bargainng power rises from its ability to offer access to country-specific 
advantages such as skilled labor, natural resources, advanced technologies etc. Those coun-
tries that possess small reserves are likely to obtain a smaller dividend from contracts with 
foreign investors (Shelley, 2005). Thus Vivoda (2011) claims that countries with higher re-
serve/production (R/P) ratios are likely to have more bargaining power than countries with 
lower R/P ratios. Moreover the profitability of production also influences the bargaining pow-
er of MNC and host country.  
Tarzi (1991) argues that MNCs do not commit large investments in countries with high 
level of political and economic risk unless they are likely to get extremely generous terms of 
investment. The level of political and economic risk is also quite important factor influencing 
host country’s bargaining power.  
Gross (1989) emphasizes that when dealing between the government and MNC is 
broadly publicized in the media the government tends to have a bargaining advantage since 
MNC is often portrayed as foreign interloper and host country may utilize public opinion to 
incline negotiations towards more favorable for the country outcomes.  
Industry level  
The host country bargaining power is greater in highly competitive industries where two 
or more MNCs are able to compete. Studying the dynamic of oil sector MNC-host country 
relationship Vivoda (2011) argues that during periods of low oil prices MNC is often wel-
comed by host government lacking investments. However during the period of higher oil 
prices host government does not experience capital difficulties and dept problems, thus it may 
not require high levels of FDI and posses higher potential bargaining power vis-à-vis MNC.  
Other stakeholders in the bargaining   
Scholars argue that MNC originating from more powerful countries in terms of politics 
and economics posses more bargaining power than MNCs originating from weaker countries 
(Eden and Molot, 2002; Tarzi, 1991). Vivoda (2011) states that the question of whether this 
potential power is transferable into actual bargaining power is context dependent.  
When institutional distance is high host country is likely to see an MNC in stereotypical 
terms, provoking liability of foreignness and making the bargain is hardly reached (Eden et al, 
2005). Some scholars have found that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play an im-
portant role in MNC-host government relationship (Doh and Teegen, 2002). NGOs often af-
fect the bargaining process by framing public discussions and debates on an issue (Nebus and 
Rufin, 2010).   
When the bargaining context changes due to technological shifts or to business cycles, 
the position of each side changes as well (Gross, 1996).  Re-bargaining between two parties 
may take place if there are some changes in the context moderating the relative bargain power 
and in the resources’ possession by two parties. In bargaining situations the value of each par-
ty’s resources is measured not by its significance for the owner but by the other party’s desire 
to get those resources (Eden and Molot, 2002). From the side of MNC its potential and rela-
tive bargaining power depends on its sustained or temporary competitive advantages (Moon 
and Lado, 2000; Schoemaker, 1990). Luo (2001) states that resource complementarity can 
influence the outcomes of bargain significantly. Than stronger this complementarity that more 
efforts each party puts to maintain MNE-state relations.  
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Table 1. Sources of bargaining power / resource (adapted from Poynter, 1982; Fagre 
and Wells, 1982; Lecraw, 1984);)  
 
Firm-level 
 
Industry-level  Country-level 
 
Size (parent firm and 
subsidiary); technology intensi-
ty; advertising intensity; intra-
MNC sourcing;  export intensi-
ty; product diversity; employ-
ment policy; political behavior; 
ownership. 
Industry competition; 
Strategic importance of indus-
try; prices;  
 
Appropriability regime; 
level of economic development; 
cultural distance; institutional 
distance   
 
 
Relative constraints 
In the OB model besides resources there are constraint that can impede MNE-state rela-
tions. These constraints might be political, institutional, economic and so on. From host coun-
try side political constraints are weak or unstable government, lack of government legitimacy; 
institutional are international agreements of membership in international organizations; eco-
nomic - balance of payments etc. From the MNE side political constraints are previous com-
mitment to the host or home country; institutional constraints - membership in international 
organizations; economic - restrictions imposed on the subsidiary.  
Taking into consideration the existence of economic, political and institutional con-
straints one can argue that actual bargaining power will differ from potential power.  
Thus the bargaining power of both sides depends on several factors: the resources con-
trolled by one party and demanded by the others, the similarity of interests, the constraints on 
each party, and the ability of one of the party to influence the behavior of the other party 
through political or economic coercion. 
2.3. The obsolescing bargain (OB) model extension in the literature 
The original OB model was born as an attempt to explain a widespread expropriation 
and nationalization of MNC subsidiaries located in developing countries in the 1970s. Since 
that time Vernon (1977) obsolescing bargain model has been occupying important position in 
explaining MNC-host country bargaining dynamic in the international political economy. 
However in the end of 1990 and the beginning of 2000 the OB model was declared as 
outlived its usefulness (Eden and Molot, 2001) as relationship between MNC and state was 
not considered as conflicting but rather as collaborating. Developing countries opened their 
markets and came to deregulation. Market-enabling regimes were recognized the same im-
portant governance tool as regulatory regimes. As a result various extensions and improve-
ments of the OB model have appeared in the literature including the political bargaining mod-
el which broaden the scope of OB model sides to different stakeholders such as NGOs or in-
ternational institutions (Eden et al, 2005) and two-tiers model developed by Ramamurti 
(2001) who underlines the role of home government in the bargaining process. Moreover 
Eden et al (2005) suggested that since MNC-host country relations have been recognized as 
cooperative little formal bargaining occurs between these two actors.  
Indeed in last decades dyadic relationship between MNC and state has evolved into 
multiparty bargaining among NGOs, host government, home governments, supranational and 
international  institutions and MNCs (Vivoda, 2011). 
Nebus and Rufin (2010) claim that while canonical bargaining power model tends to 
explain the dyadic relationship between the nation state and MNE subsidiary the extended 
model needs to explain bargaining over the different complex issues arising among nation 
states and MNEs nowadays such as government interventions in cross-border acquisitions; 
privatizations disputes and so on. The authors argue that the number and types of actors and 
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their relationships result in another level of complexity for the prediction of outcomes of any 
bargaining process. 
Moon and Lado (2000) argue that “the empirical findings of the sources of MNC bar-
gaining power are often inconsistent and the theoretical views on this topic remain divergent” 
(p. 86). The authors (Moon and Lado, 2000) develop the model within resource-based view. 
They suggest that firm-specific resources directly determine MNC-Host government bargain-
ing power relationship and that country and industry-level factors might serve as moderators 
of this relationship.  
Furthermore the existing bargaining literature has not explicitly addressed the link be-
tween MNC bargaining power and home government. Although the extant literature has ad-
dressed how  an MNC bargaining power is associated with such outcomes as ownership level, 
it has not sufficiently explained how the bargaining power enables firm to generate economic 
rents and achieve its goals within a particular host country (Moon and Lado, 2000).  
Eden and Molot (200 ) assume that existing host-home country relations can create 
governance inseparability that actually constrains the independent actions of host country 
governments. The bargaining process than is getting more complex involving two levels. 
Thus home government can shift the bargaining power in MNE’s favor depending on im-
portance of this country for host country.  
Vachani (19995) has identified three forces moderating bargaining success: political 
climate in the host country; host’s perception of value associated with the multinational’s op-
erations and multinational’s ownership preferences. The relationship between the host and 
home countries can affect all these forces determining the dynamic success. For example the  
political climate is more accepting for  MNC from a home country culturally proximate to the 
host country or possessing stronger historical ties (Hofstede, 1980). On the other hand such 
strong ties might result in a overestimated perception of value attached to MNC operations by 
the host government. Same is applicable to multinational ownership preferences. The famili-
arity (cultural and historical) of host country leads to higher commitment to the environment.  
Besides home country domestic and international institutions might constrain both par-
ties’ strategies either through previous contractual commitments or changes in bargaining 
power (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999).  
Ramamurti (2001) claims that MNC-host country relations can no longer be viewed as a 
static, two-party negotiation, but rather must be viewed as a dynamic, two-tier, multi-party 
bargaining process. The author says that first tier bargaining takes place between host (devel-
oping) and home (developed) countries and can occur either bilaterally or through institutions 
like IMF, the World Bank or WTO. This so called macro-level anticipates the micro-level or 
second tier bargaining between the MNE and host government.  
Ramamurti (2001) argues that tier-2 (MNE-host government) is driven by micro varia-
bles such as MNC’s technology base or  size of host country market whereas tier-1 (host-
home government) is driven by macroeconomic and political variables. And here such factors 
as bilateral trade, the magnitude of aid, historical and cultural ties, geopolitics and so on are 
important (Bayard and Elliott, 1994; Vandevelde, 1993).  
Li et al (2013) argue that revisited by Ramamurti model cannot fully explain the rela-
tionship between Chinese MNCs and host-government by two reasons. First, Chinese gov-
ernment often go beyond establishing investment agreements as they tend to include the pro-
vision of low-interest loans to support infrastructure development for example. Thus, Chinese 
government plays more important role that it is set in the two-tier model. Second reason is 
that Chinese MNCs are often state-owned what means that the level of MNC-home-
government relationship is also involved.  Analyzing cases of Chinese MNCs investments in 
Africa authors have found that instead of engaging in a two-tier bargaining process the home 
government (China) and MNC engage in modified one-tier bargaining process with the host 
country. Chinese government often represents the collective interests of Chinese resource 
MNCs as private as state-owned and therefore the second-tier negotiation between host gov-
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ernment and MNC are not needed. However this style of negotiation is relevant specifically 
for high political risk and weak economic developed countries. Chinese government in this 
case helps its MNEs to handle risky and unstable environment.  
 
Figure 2. Revisited model, Two-tiers (Ramamurti, 2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper contributes to the development of bargaining power theory in the context of 
emerging market MNC (EMNC) - emerging host country (EHC) relationship. It builds upon 
previous theory and integrates it into the theoretical model, the dynamic of which is discussed 
further. 
3. Research settings 
Host country political environment  
Most of the scholars agree that Central East Europe (CEE) region represents a very spe-
cific political and cultural context, distinguishing these countries from other emerging econ-
omies. Since 1990s institutional setting of this context have been gradually changing. Many 
of the formal rules of the game were not defined what resulted in tremendous uncertainty, 
whereas informal institutions were substituting for the lack of formal institutions (Lavigne, 
1996; Peng, 2000, 2003).  In particular where rules governing markets are vaguely defined 
firms have to rely more on relationships and business networks (Peng and Heath, 1996) 
Montenegro undergoes through significant changes in 21 century. Being part of Serbia 
and Montenegro state since 2002, Montenegro initiated the process of detachment from Ser-
bia and in 2006 the independence of Montenegro was declared. Since that time the new inde-
pendent state shapes it course on European Union and NATO. In 2008 Montenegro recogniz-
es Kosovo as independent state (Russia does not) and in the same year it applies for EU 
membership. In 2012 European Commission published its report on Montenego’s progress, 
Home country 
Direct  Indirect  
Unilateral actions 
and bilateral nego-
tiations 
Bargaining through 
multilateral institu-
tions: WTO, World 
Bank, IMF etc.  
  
Bargaining based on home and host  
country’s political and macroeconomic 
circumstances  
Host developing country 
Bargaining based on host country’s and 
MNC’s microeconomic circumstances  
  
 
Multinational corporation 
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where positively estimated the country’s effort to become a member of EU. In 2014 Monte-
negro officially becomes a candidate to membership in European Union. In same year Monte-
negro implies sanctions against Russia. The country becomes a member of NATO since 2016.  
Case description  
Construction of an aluminium smelter in Montenegro was first proposed in the 1960s, 
when significant quantities of high quality bauxite ore were discovered near Nikšić. The con-
struction of KAP began in 1969, while production of aluminium began in 1971. The KAP 
produces its own alumina, extracting it out of the bauxite shipped from the Nikšić bauxite 
mine. The factory also has its own production of pre-baked anodes. The smelter has an in-
stalled capacity of 120,000 tons of liquid aluminum per year. KAP is connected by railway 
with bauxite mines near Nikšić and the Port of Bar, and the Podgorica Airport is only a few 
kilometers away. The plant had its most difficult times during UN-imposed economic sanc-
tions on FR Yugoslavia. During the sanctions, the production was reduced to 13% of capaci-
ty. In the period 1997–1999 KAP participated with 8.2–6.7% in GDP of Montenegro, and 65–
67% in export for the same period.  
On December 1, 2005, KAP was privatized. 65.4394% shares were sold to Salomon En-
terprises Limited (later renamed CEAC – Central European Aluminum Company), a company 
based in Cyprus, for €48.5 million and obligations to invest over €50 million in its moderniza-
tion and environmental upgrade. CEAC is fully owned by En+ Group, and even the negotia-
tions on the sale were conducted directly between Oleg Deripaska and the then Prime Minis-
ter of Montenegro, Milo Đukanović. 
In May 2006, CEAC claimed that "various breaches of representations and warranties" 
of the deal were discovered by accountants Deloitte, including KAP having "hidden" debts 
and obligations towards the state totaling tens of millions of euros. In addition, the govern-
ment-certified 2004 accounts were deemed inaccurate when it came to working capital and 
other assets. "It became evident to CEAC that KAP's initial financial situation had been mis-
represented," the company claimed. 
 During 2008, the KAP has struggled to survive the impact of ongoing economic crisis. 
The low trading price of aluminium, and expensive production inputs, primarily the electricity 
and alumina production, have resulted in KAP generating daily losses of up to €200,000. The 
company has been unable to survive ever since without the constant Government subsides, 
primarily through writing off the debt for electricity. 
In June 2009, the financial situation at the company had not improved, leaving KAP in 
danger of being closed by CEAC. The government, not wanting to see its largest company 
being shut down, agreed to guarantee a €45 million loan. In exchange, the government would 
receive half of the stakes owned by CEAC, leaving CEAC with a stake of 29.3%. 
As relationship between Russian owners and management and the Government of Mon-
tenegro became increasingly sour, there was an ongoing debate within the country about the 
fate of the company. The size of the company, number of employees, and its impact on the 
Montenegrin trade balance imply that efforts will be made by the Government to keep the 
company alive, while dissatisfaction with Russian owners grew.  
In June 2012 the German creditors used Montenegrin government guarantees and 
forced it to pay outstanding debts to them. In July 2013, KAP officially went bankrupt, hav-
ing up to that point accumulated a debt of 383 million euros, while the company itself is 
worth 180 million euros. By the end of 2013, KAP was offered for sale again, and in June 
2014 KAP was sold for 28 million Euros to Montenegrin company Uniprom.  
By June 2016 the company has not yet fully recovered production, with former and cur-
rent employees frequently protesting and blocking the company due to unpaid wages. Ever 
since the company went into bankruptcy, former Russian owners and managers have started 
many lawsuits in front of Montenegrin and European courts, which haven’t been fully re-
solved until this day.  
 14  
4. Research methodology 
Vaara and Tienari (2004) argue that in order to conduct more critical analysis scholars 
should consider making use of methods that have proved to be useful tools in humanistic and 
social studies more generally. Discourse analysis (DA) is a cross-disciplinary methodology 
that has been linked to the analysis of text and talk in almost all of the humanities and social 
sciences during the last few decades. DA is also connected to postmodern and poststructural-
ist philosophy. 
Four essential characteristics of CDA according to Wodak and Meyer, 2002: 1) CDA 
aims at revealing taken-for-granted assumptions in social, societal, political and economic 
spheres and at examining power relationships between various kind of actors; 2) the research-
er is not a “neutral observer”, but his/her role is to acknowledge a particular kind of (critical) 
perspective; 3) contextually is a crucial issue in CDA, thus the ability to place specific texts in 
their context is essential. The historical dimension is especially important here. One cannot 
understand specific texts and discourses without considering the historical processes that have 
led to the current situation. 4) intertextuality - the linkages between different discourses and 
texts. One cannot understand fully specific texts or discursive acts without linking them with 
other texts and discursive acts.   
Basically any kinds of textual material are suitable for CDA such as media texts, ar-
chival material, interview transcription etc. Therefore we use all the materials available in-
cluding interviews with representatives from both sides. As far as the insider/outsider role is 
concerned it is very clear that a native of a particular country is in a privileged position in 
terms of being able to place specific contexts in their historical and intertextual contexts 
(Vaara and Tienari, 2004). As our team consists of natives of both countries possessing lan-
guage knowledge we believe that we can enrich the discourse analysis by comparing dis-
courses in different countries. 
Taking into consideration the ambiguous nature of investigated case and the specificity 
of political, economic, and institutional environment we claim that qualitative method should 
be applied and critical discourse analysis is particularly suitable.  We aim to follow Kahl and 
Grodal (2016) multilevel discourse analysis methodology 
1) Historical reconstruction. This step aims to identify texts and to develop a con-
textual and temporal understanding of their sequence (Kipping, Wadhani, and Bucheli, 2014). 
The questions to answer at this stage: when the text was produced? Who created it? Where it 
was created and how it relates to other texts. We create timeline of the entire process from the 
initial negotiation until lawsuits with lost KAP by Rusal. We identify milestones of this long 
dramatic way and collect all the texts related to these events. After that we pick up the most 
influential texts in terms of creating discourses in both cultural and political contexts – Russia 
and Montenegro, in both languages.  
2) Intratextual data coding. The aim of this stage is to look through different text 
levels such as words, clauses, sentences and paragraphs and to code them according to back-
ground theory. Different types of sentences (such as declarative, imperative, or interrogative) 
might be also coded. Leading by OB model theory we have chosen three important issues to 
consider which are resources, goals and constraints. Following abductive approach we also 
intent to come up with additional codes and constructs in the analysis.     
3) Intertextual data coding. Interpretation of the texts also depends on its link to 
other texts within same discourses. Thus at this stage not only linguistic features are coded 
but also references to other texts. The authors underline three types of these links: direct ties; 
conceptual ties and shared location. The character of refereeing to another text is also im-
portant: whether it is affirming of challenging. We are looking at references in texts to other 
chosen texts as well as authors and concepts used.  
4) Contextual data coding. As people create texts within a specific time and place. 
Broader contextual themes influence what is actually said in text and how it may be interpret-
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ed (Khaire and Wadhwani, 2010). At this stage it is required to identify texts produced in oth-
er contexts that are related to focal discourse. We anticipate such contextual themes as Russia 
– Montenegro relationship, Montenegro – EU relationship, political change in Montenegro.  
5) Iteration and theory development. At this stage the researcher should cycle 
back to the research questions and to track the evolving understanding of the domain area to 
the theoretical question (Eisenhardt, 1989). Particularly important those findings which are 
inconsistent with ideas presented in the existing literature. 
4.1. Data analysis 
We collected a wide range of texts derived from Russian and Montenegro’s main news-
papers. At the first stage we collected all the texts mentioning Deripaska – KAP or Deripaska 
– Montenegro themes. Scanning of these texts allows us to reveal several important issues 
that form the discourses around the case. These issues are host-home (Montenegro – Russia) 
country relations and host-country – international institutions (EU/NATO) relations. It re-
quired additional texts collection. The statistic and newspaper description is presented in the 
Table 2. All the texts were analyzed in its original language either Russian or Serbian.  
As we look retrospectively on the case we track 7 years period of time (2005-2012) for 
Rusal – KAP discourse and 10 years period of time (2004-2014) for other two discourses as 
we presume that it is important to track inter-countries and international discourses some time 
before and after the major event.  
We used Advego software for semantic analysis of all the texts representing Russia – 
Montenegro and Montenegro – International Institutions discourses. The content analysis of 
KAP-Deripaska texts we did manually in native languages. 
 
Table 2. Major Newspaper in Russian and Montenegro  
 
Newspaper  Ownership  Political alignment  
“Dnevne novine” (Me) Owned by Greek investors, but are 
considered close to the government  
pro-government, 
pro-DPS 
“Pobjeda”(Me) it is the only daily newspaper in Mon-
tenegro that is state-owned (85,9%) 
pro-government, 
pro-DPS 
“Vijesti” (Me) The ownership is currently split be-
tween Montenegrin partners (59%), 
Austrian Styria Medien AG (25%), 
and American fund MDLF started by 
George Soros (16%). 
anti-government they are also pro-
western, pro-EU, pro-NATO and 
were proponents of Montenegrin 
independence, 
“Dan”(Me) Jumedia Mont d.o.o anti-government, but also 
considered pro-Serbian, pro-
Russian, anti-western and anti-
EU/NATO 
Kommersant (Ru) Alisher Usmanov (Russian business 
magnat) 
It is a leading liberal business 
broadsheet 
Vedomosti (Ru) Before 2015 It was previously a joint 
venture between Dow Jones, the Fi-
nancial Times and the publishers of 
The Moscow Times 
Independent business newpaper  
Lenta.ru (Ru) Rambler Media Group One of the largest online newspa-
per in Russia, before 2014 consid-
ered as independent oppositional 
media.  
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4.2. Discussion of results 
Analyzing media discourse Russian MNE – Host government (Montenegro) we can dis-
tinguish three important milestones: 2005 – the acquisition of Montenegro's enterprise by 
Russian MNC owned by Deripaska; 2009 – the financial crisis and intense negotiation be-
tween Montenegro and MNE; 2012 – start of bankruptcy and KAP nationalization.  
Following abductive approach we analyze media discourse relating our findings to the 
literature and returning back to analysis. Bargaining power theory suggests that resources 
have crucial meaning for the bargaining. Thus both sides’ resources were our starting point 
for the analysis.  
Resources MNC: Rusal as Russian MNE possess strong political resources such as per-
sonal ties with the president and government support, it has access to natural reserves of alu-
minum, bauxites etc. Moreover Rusal has an experience operating in emerging markets in the 
risky and uncertain environment. It is one of the largest aluminum companies in the world. 
Resources host-country: Montenegro in 2005 still being part of Serbia and Montenegro 
is developing country, located in Europe with strong prospects to become part of European 
Union. It has national reserves of bauxite and aluminum smelter KAP provides almost half of 
the Montenegro’s export. These resources remain unchanged for both sides.  
Media discourse around resources: Although both party’s resources seem desirable for 
each other the deal was not extremely beneficial neither for Rusal nor for Montenegro. 
“Rusal, Sual –holding (Russia), Alcoa (the USA), Alcan (Canada), Norsk Gydro (Norway), 
Vedanta Resources (India) and Glencore (Switzerland) participated in the initial tender of 
Montenegro’s government. However by the end of the process the only company remained 
was Rusal, all others dismissed their application as the terms of the deal were not favorable. 
But even the only applicant proposed less price that the state of Montenegro expected – €48,5 
mln instead of €185 mln”. (Kommersant, 07.04.2005) “Privatization of KAP was from the 
very start under heavy criticism. In the beginning, only because of the process which, after 
coming to a dead end when it went through the legal means, was finished after the direct 
meeting of the then Prime Minister Djukanovic and the Russian investor Oleg Deripaska, who 
came to that meeting, which was held in one of Podgorica’s cafes, in a private jet that was 
worth more than the Government asked for its most important company” (Radio Slobodna 
Evropa, 01.03.2012) 
Tarzi (1991) argues that MNCs do not commit large investments in countries with high 
level of political and economic risk unless they are likely to get extremely generous terms of 
investment. As we can observe Rusal does not get extremely generous benefits moreover this 
asset for Rusal really profitable: electricity price is high, KAP has a big dept, it requires seri-
ous modernization and the volume of production is “drop in the sea” for Rusal. Not surpris-
ingly that other MNCs cancel their participation in tender. However Rusal accomplished the 
deal. The model of Rusal-Montenegro bargain is introduced in the figure N. Therefore we as-
sume that there are other important factors affecting MNC’s decision to invest in foreign 
countries and host-country decision to agree MNC’s terms of bargaining.  
Recent literature identified different stakeholders and factors that may influence MNC-
host-country bargaining such as home-country, international institutions, supra-national insti-
tutions, NGOs, relative constraints and relative stakes. Some of those factors may be applied 
to the case of Rusal-Montenegro bargaining.  
Thus Vivoda (2011) argue that an MNC’s home country may affect its bargaining pow-
er in a host country due to historical, colonial, cultural and political factors. If an MNC origi-
nates from the country with strong political ties and cultural proximate to host country it can 
be more tolerant to political climate in host country. However such ties might cause a higher 
perception of value attached to the MNC’s investment by both host government and MNC, 
because there may be a closer fit between company’s management approach and local infor-
mal rules (Beamish, 1993; Stopford, 1974; Vachani, 1995).  
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Russia and Balkan countries (in 2005 Montenegro was part of the Serbia and Montene-
gro) have long historical and cultural relations. Moreover Russia has been one of the main 
investors to Montenegro, what is frequently cited in both media. 
 As the number of articles was enormous we did semantic analysis in order to identify 
dominating semantic kernels in each discourse.  “Cultural proximity discourse” (2004-2006): 
the relationship between two countries on the high level is visible and being part of one coun-
try Montenegro is inseparable from Serbia in this discourse. The cultural ties come to  
 forefront especially in regard to religion (the semantic kernel “orthodox” and “Patriarch” are 
dominating). Another visible semantic kernel is security which says about importance of this 
issue in the relationship between two countries. In Montenegrin media this first phase the has 
also quite benevolent tone, although there are calls for reconsidering the deal, suspected cor-
ruption and lack of transparency. 
 
Figure 2. RUSAL-Montenegro bargaining power 
 
 
 
We assume that home-government bargains with both MNC and host-government. But 
in this situation MNC and host government pursue different strategies. Host-country (Monte-
negro) accounts first of all relative stakes which didn’t get much attention from the scholars. 
This dimension of MNC-host country bargaining was acknowledged by Gross (1996) who 
says that the side that has less at stake will have a bargaining advantage over the side that has 
more at stake. Furthermore Gross (1996) presumes that in a situation in which the government 
has very much at stake for example a major mining project or an electric power plant such 
government might be specifically keen on successfully concluding a bargain. Relying on 
close relationship with Russia Montenegrin government preferred to have “bird on the hand 
rather than two in bushes”. Besides, the informal constituent of the bargaining was so strong 
that some background information about the enterprise debt was hidden in the agreement. 
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“CEAK counts that Montenegrin government selling KAP provided false information con-
cerning company’s finance state. Now Rusal requires compensation of  €300 mln which is 
almost half of the budget of Montenegro” (Vedomosti, 12.09.2012). 
While Montenegrin government considers first of all relative stakes Russian MNC ex-
pected future benefits of the deal. (quotation). The expected benefits in this case depend on 
home-host country relationship. And again the degree of informality on the bargain illustrates 
the degree of trust in good relationships between two countries. The bargain model of first 
stage bargaining is presented on the figure 3.  
Second discourse we defined as “political change, but close economic cooperation dis-
course” (2006-2011). In 2006 we see change in media discourse of Russia-Montenegro con-
text in Russian media. Serbia, Kosovo, independence and referendum become dominating 
semantic kernel in the discourse. Moreover in 2006 discourse the USA and Washington come 
up together with political and relational metaphors. Thus we can claim that political discourse 
dominates in that time. In 2007 political discourse is going on, but some other dominating 
semantic words step in such as Putin, Djukanovic, Europe, investments, diplomatic relation-
ships. 
 
Figure 3. The OB model revised. Stage 1. 
 
 
    
 
 
In 2008-2010 Montenegro is not very present in media discourse of Russian newspaper. 
However those texts, which exist, suggest following semantic kernel: president, Kremlin, 
Philip Vuyanovich, Moscow, Podgoritsa, Deripaska, relationships, investments.  We conclude 
that Deriapska’s asset in Montenegro is an issue at the top level and this problem has been 
discussing between two governments.  
Montenegrin media represent a bit different tone of the texts. Second part (2008 – 2012) 
sees a surge of number articles published, with discourse about the Rusal – KAP takeover get-
ting a more negative connotation. Keywords in this period are again KAP – Rusal, Russia, 
EU, the West, but now the terms failure, strike, debts, and bank are visible. Russian side is 
Outcomes  
Relative stakes 
Relative  future benefits MNC’s resources 
Host-country resources 
Home-country 
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painted as corrupted, arrogant and unreasonable. During this period the owner of Rusal – Oleg 
Deripaska is mentioned distinctively more often, along with the and the higher levels of Rus-
sian  political elite. 
Some important events happened at that time namely financial crisis and aluminium 
prices drop, Kosovo recognition by Montenegro, but not Russia and slight turn of Montenegro 
towards EU.  
Initially the goals of both parties do not contradict each other. Host government requires 
investments in enterprise’s debt, restructuring of the production, modernization and sustaina-
ble management. MNC aims to get access to resources and production as well as access to 
European market and makes the shelter profitable. However over time the goals of both par-
ties have been changing. “Milorad Katnic, minister of finance, claims that return back the 
control over KAP is necessary because it allows government to define the policy of KAP” 
(Lenta. Ru, 08.10.2009) 
For Russian MNC the goal has been changing from “getting profit and access to Euro-
pean market” to “avoid loss and “save face”. “The firm of Oleg Deripaska negotiates with 
Turkish company Tosyali holding about selling of 29,3 % of shares of Kombinat aluminijuma 
Podgorica (КАР)” (Kommersant, 29.08.2012)” 
The home government (Russia) did not really change its initial goal – to keep presence 
and influence in the Balkan region. However with transforming political environment and 
degradation of relationship with West Russia shifted its priorities to the other regions. 
“En+(Rusal) is ready to sell KAP for adequate price as the company’s strategy now is focus-
ing on the projects in East Siberia and Asia-Pacific Region” (Kommersant, 29.08.2012) 
The most drastic change has happened with host country’s goals and priorities. Firstly 
the goal of Montenegro’s state was to save the smelter, jobs and to attract investments. With 
political transformation (independence, political power change, orientation to EU and NATO) 
the goal of the state has changed: instead of saving the smelter the state desired to deserve fa-
vor from international institutions that’s way it has to get rid of Russia’s dependence. “Offi-
cial from the opposition party “Democratic front”, Nebojša Medojević claims that the gov-
ernment of Montenegro, lead by Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic will now receive “invoice” 
for his past work. “He will now pay the price for entering dangerous and hazardous game 
with Great Powers. He was promising to Washington and Brussels that he will lead Montene-
gro into NATO, that he will raise popular support for entering NATO, and on the other side 
he spoke the opposite – that he will not enter NATO. This will cost him dearly, it will cost the 
DPS (Democratic Party of Socialists), and it will unfortunately cost the whole country and its 
citizens” ( Radio Slobodna Evropa, 12.07.2013.) 
There were some constraints as well. Firstly, for host country it was crucial to save the 
smelter and jobs for many people, as this smelter was one of the major contributors to coun-
try’s GDP. The smelter required serious investments in its modernization and besides it had 
big external debt. For Rusal the price did not correspond to the expectation. It was higher than 
Rusal estimated.  
The biggest challenge for both sides but particularly for MNC was financial crisis and 
aluminum prices drop. With new prices it was difficult to stay profitable under the same 
terms. This external change influenced a lot the situation and catalyzed the showdown.  
The pressure from international institutions was noticeable for host country (Montene-
gro) first of all, but for MNC and home government as well.  
Another important constraint was employee’s strikes. The host government faced nu-
merous conflicts with trade unions and community.  
 The third media discourse from 2012-2014 we call “Triality: Russia – Montenegro – 
EU” discourse. In 2012 Russian media discourse has changed. Now we observe dominating 
of Europe, Kremlin, Serbia, European Union, integration semantic kernels. By 2014 in this 
discourse such semantic kernels as Russia, links, sanctions, against, anti-Russian dominate, 
representing quite tense relationship between both countries. 
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Third segment in Montenegrin media is concerned with the aftermant of the failed 
investment, where media discourse takes increasingly hostile and toxic shape, with keywords 
such failed investment, goverment bailout, bankrupcy, ecological problems, lawsuit, arbitrage 
and govertment takeover are used more frequently.  Number or articles with negative context 
that are focusing on Russian side in general and Oleg Deripaska in particular can be observed 
in this period.  
In conclusion, test analysis shows that special care must be taken in dividing underlying 
political aspect of the investment to political ties that are part of the discourse in sense of what 
kind of signals about EU/NATO integrations is Montenegro giving away to the West, as well 
as the another one that is considering Russian – Montenegrin political ties in a more narrow 
sense. 
The OB model revised 
In general the semantic analysis of Russia – Montenegro context and relations from the 
viewpoint of the one specific media outlet that was taken for the test analysis, it can be identi-
fied that during the whole observed period Rusal investment is very often put in the Russina-
Montenegrin relations, and more importantly Montenegrin-EU relations. KAP – Rusal seman-
tic kernel is usually mentioned along with Montenegro EU Ascension, NATO and influence 
with. There is also another line of discourse which is concerned less with politics and more 
with economics, where the keywords are privatization, restructuring, saving KAP and ineffi-
ciency are most often found.   
Based on these findings we suggest revisited OB model which is presented on Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. The revisited OB model of MNC – host-country bargaining 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the time when cultural proximity discourse dominates the OB model looks similar to 
the model introduced by Ramamurti (2001). At the first place home government bargains 
with host country, but at the same time home government bargains with MNE two. After this 
phase the second round of negotiations between MNE and host country occurs. The classical 
model suggests that MNE in this case has more desired resources than host country and host 
country may come to terms of MNE. It is partly true concerning this case. As the terms of 
contract did not correspond to first plan and were unlucrative to the host country at the first 
glance. However MNE agreed the deal accepting the terms which were not lucrative for it ei-
ther. Apparently two parties of this bargain sacrifice short-run benefits for sake of future ben-
efits or avoiding risks (relative stakes).  
On the next stage of host country-MNE bargaining the context and power balance have 
changed. First of all between host country and MNE as well as MNE’s home country such 
MNC’s resources 
Host-country resources Outcomes  
Relative stakes 
Relative  expected benefits 
Home-country 
Supra-national institute 
Industry change 
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power as supranational institution - EU has appeared. Montenegro was aiming to join the EU 
what promises some benefits in the future but it also means that Montenegro should follow 
certain rules. The privatized enterprise is strategic asset for the country therefore to be inde-
pendent on the third side (in this case it is Russia) host government has to get back control on 
the enterprise. Thus host country bargains not only with home country and MNE but also with 
supranational institution.  
Moreover such contextual factor as drastic drop of aluminum prices played important 
role for MNC recourses and goals. MNC has changed its strategy from pursuing future bene-
fits to avoiding losses (relative stakes).  
At the third phase of the bargaining the power balance has changed as MNC and home 
country resources were counterbalanced by supranational institutions’ future benefits and in-
dustrial unfavorable terms. 
5. Conclusions 
In this study by mean of discourse analysis we revisit the obsolescing bargain model 
applying it to the context which was not explored before: MNC from emerging country-
emerging host country relationship. We analyze the case of acquisition by Russian MNC 
(Rusal) Montenegrin state-owned aluminum smelter KAP.  
First of all we examine the case from perspective of both sides resources as they have 
been recognized as crucial for the bargaining power. Although resources of MNC and host-
country were relatively unchangeable the bargaining power balance was dynamic. This fact 
encouraged investigation of other factors or actors influencing the outcomes of the bargain. 
First we introduce new concept – relative future benefits which takes in the OB model an im-
portant position. We also add to the model relative stake dimension that was introduced in 
literature before but was not fully explored. Furthermore three important factors shape the 
bargain of MNC – host-country bargain in studied case namely home-country, industry 
change and supranational institution.  
We identified three major discourses in media and analyzed how the OB model changes 
depending on the discourses. In “cultural proximity discourse” the home government played 
significant role bargaining with both MNC and host –country: influencing on relative stakes 
of the one side (host country) and relative future benefits of the other side (MNC). In “politi-
cal change, but economic cooperation” and “triality: Russia-Montenegro-EU” discourses be-
sides home-country two other important factors affected the bargain outcomes: supranational 
institution brought pressure on host-country’s relative future benefits whereas industry change 
(prices fall down) on MNC’s relative stake.  
We contribute to the bargain power theory by revisiting the obsolescing bargain model. Thus 
we argue that home country support MNC and complement it with bargaining power in the 
situation of environmental challenges pressing host-country relative stake at the same time. 
However as soon as these challenges become too costly for home country it gives place to 
other forces such as supranational institution and industry change. 
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